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陈一文 (cheniwan@263.net) 2007.11
《“科学共同体”及其规则无法“自拔解套”!》第59篇“附录”
1975年2月4日海城地震发生前的2月3日出现了非常迷惑人的“平静期”,什么人基于什么前兆信息的预测报告触发了2月4日临震前撤出的预警?海城地区的“群测点”在其中发挥了什么作用?
海城地震发生后,加拿大与美国的地震代表团曾经分别到海城地区现场访问,分别于1976年与1977年写出过调查报告。
前边介绍过的《预报1975年海城地震》对此记录如下(注:与前边一样,为保证有关重要记录的真实性,下边保留“调查报告”有关段落的英文原文,同时提供本顾问的中译文)。
-- Basis for Evacuation Decisions
-- 撤离决定的依据
-- On 4 February 1975, the commune or brigade leading cadres would have obtained information directly or indirectly from six different sources: (1) the general provincial warning relayed to them through city and county committees, (2) in the case of Yingkou County, an evacuation order from the county committee, (3) nearby earthquake observatories, particularly the Shipengyu Observatory, (4) local amateur precursory monitoring groups such as the team of the Haicheng Observatory, (5) neighboring villages and industrial units, and (6) the foreshocks and the damage they were already causing.
-- 1975年2月4日,公社或大队领导干部直接或间接从六个不同的来源获得信息:(1)通过市级与县级革委会传达给他们的总的省一级的警告;(2)在营口的例子中,撤离的命令由县革委会下达;(3)附近的地震观测站,特别如石硼峪地震观测站的情况;(4)地方的业余前兆检测工作组,如海城地震观测站(“群测点”);(5)附近的村庄与企业,与(6)前震以及已经造成的损失。
-- In Yingkou County and some neighboring Haicheng villages that overheard Yingkou’s loudspeaker broadcast, the decision was easier to make. In the neighborhood of the Shipengyu Observatory, the villagers relied on their trust in the observatory workers. Those who heard about the amateur prediction by the Haicheng Observatory also had a good reason to evacuate.
-- 在营口县以及能够听到营口广播喇叭的某些附近海城村庄,容易做出撤离的决定。在石硼峪地震观测站附近区域,村民依赖于他们对于观测站工作人员的信任。听到了海城地震观测站(“群测点”)做出的业余预测意见的人,也有撤离的好理由。
《辽宁日报网站》2005年2月8日《30年前土仪器准确预报海城大地震》对于海城地震观测站(“群测点”)成功的地震预测贡献总结如下:
http://newspaper.lndaily.com.cn/lnrb/200502/5317420050208.htm
-- 30年前,在国家和省发出“辽南地区有地震”的预报之后,海城地震观测站利用简单的土仪器,准确地预测出这次大灾难,在临震前6个小时,成功地发出了震前预报。海城大地震,也因此成为世界上第一个被准确预报的大地震。
-- 今年61岁的姜成田老人是海城大地震的亲历者。当时,30出头的姜成田在海城县地震观测站做技术观测工作。据姜老回忆,1969年渤海地区发生地震后,华北地区又发生强震,国家地震局加强了东北南部地区的地震测报工作。因此在1972年10月,在海城县建立了地震观测站,1973年1月1日,正式投入地震观测工作。当时,地震观测站在海城县东部郊区的玉皇山脚下,全站共4间瓦房,全员6人,其中包括5个临时工,最大的25岁,最小的才16岁。观测站的仪器设备极其简陋,只有一台六四型烟熏式地震仪,一台水氡分析仪,还有四种自己安装的测震设备。
-- “7.3级海城大地震的成功预报,多亏了海城地震观测站临震前6个小时的准确观测。”姜成田老人回忆说。
-- 据姜成田回忆,在省地震办的指导下,为了详细记录观测到的宝贵数据,在地震来临前,观测站所有工作人员每人管一摊,管电话、看土地电、看地倾斜仪……1975年1月8日晚,天阴沉沉,对面不见人,而且还有硫磺味……1975年1月15日,海城首次出现小震活动。2月1日至2月4日,先后发生20余次小震,地震观测站的土地电(用来观测岩石电阻率变化的仪器)可记录实跳信号。经观测,2月3日晚和2月4日一早,分别发生了4.3级和4.7级的有感地震。人们从梦中惊醒,个别百姓家倒了烟囱、房上掉下了瓦。县地震办也在当天接到群众反映,有黄鼠狼搬家、大牲畜跳圈逃跑、老鼠发呆不怕人及井水上涨、变味、有响声等现象。这期间,省、鞍山地震办的领导电话不断。
-- 5个观测员一眼不眨地守着土仪器。2月4日下午2时,土地电终于出现6次大幅实跳信号,自制的地倾斜仪向东南方向报警,经大家共同研究,做出结论,“大地震在海城东南”,并以书面形式向县里报告:在海城东部今晚6时后将发生5级以上破坏性地震。
-- 由于时间紧迫,地震观测站决定立即向海城东南的14个重点公社发通知,做好预防。由观测员王力华骑车到县里送书面报告。在送报告途中,王力华也把地震的预警消息传给了路人。
-- 时间一分一秒地过去。当晚7时36分,突然,一道蓝光闪电划破天际,紧接着,闷雷般的响声从天而降,地光在空中闪过,红色火球从地面升起,房屋随之倒塌……那“地动山摇”的时刻,在此后漫长的岁月中,也成为了老海城人至今挥之不去的难忘记忆。
-- 地震发生后,观测站工作人员在没水没电的情况下,坚持观测了7天7夜,收集了上百次余震现象,为灾后清除障碍物争取时间,并为火车通过提供了安全保障。
-- 发生7.3级大地震,可以说是一次灭顶之灾。但因为预测准确,把更多的生命从死亡线上成功地拉了回来。据海城地震观测站的负责人介绍,当时,极震区的海城牌楼镇丁家沟生产大队,由于震前发动群众住进了防震棚,在全队700多间民房倒塌了550间的情况下,878人无一伤亡。位于极震区的英落公社,也因为震前及时疏散了群众,全社35786人,只有44人遇难。
-- 据权威数字证明:由于这次无数个精确微观监测数据、无数条宏观信息收集和及时预报,以及采取的一系列应急防震措施,海城地震全区人员伤亡约1.8万人,其中重伤4292人,轻伤12688人,死亡1085人。在省地震办的指导下,海城地震观测站震前6小时预报,挽救10万人的生命和40亿元经济损失,获得国务院通报表扬。
《预报1975年海城地震》对“海城地震观测站临震前的准确预测与预报”的基本事实予以确认,尽管某些细节有出入(注:与前边一样,为保证有关重要记录的真实性,下边保留“调查报告”有关段落的英文原文,同时提供本顾问的中译文)。
-- However, although not across the whole county, evacuation indeed took place sporadically in parts of Haicheng. We were told the following story by Mr. Qiao Changman, a former worker of the amateur Haicheng Earthquake Observatory. Workers of the observatory had been making amateur telluric current observations. Their readings showed a large jump a couple of hours before the MS 4.7 event (largest foreshock) in the morning. Just before 2 p.m. the readings showed a similar but larger jump. They then predicted that an earthquake “greater than M 4–5” might occur “within three hours.” Mr. Qiao produced a written version (as evidence) of the prediction and asked a fellow worker to hand deliver it to Haicheng County’s Earthquake Office. During his bicycle trip to the Earthquake Office, the messenger told some friends about this prediction. The news then quickly spread and triggered evacuation in that neighborhood, in the northeastern suburb of the Haicheng County.
-- 然而,尽管不在全县所有地方,但是人员撤出确实在海城零星的地方发生。业余的海城地震观测站的一位工作人员乔长满(音译,Qiao Changman)告诉了我们下边的故事。观测站的工作人员从事业余的土地电(telluric current)观测。他们的记录在当天早上Ms4.7的一个地震(最强的前震)前数小时曾经显示一个大的脉冲。(1975年2月4日)下午2点前记录显示了又一次类似的强脉冲。他们即预测了“M4-5级以上的”地震可能在“三个小时内”发生。乔长满(音译,Qiao Changman)书写了一个预测意见(作为证据),并且要求一位同事面交给海城县地震办公室。骑自行车途中,送信者将预测的情况告诉了一些朋友。消息很快传并触发了海城县东北郊区附近地区人员撤出(房屋),
Mr. Qiao and coworkers must have also immediately reported their prediction by telephone to the Earthquake Office of Anshan City, 40 km away, because we later found a record of their prediction at 2 p.m., 4 February, in the log book of Anshan’s Earthquake Office (6 – 5). We did not check whether the Haicheng Observatory had made other (false) predictions previously.
-- 乔先生及其同事必定同时立即用电话将自己定预测意见报告给40公里外的鞍山市地震办公室,因为我们后来在鞍山市地震办公室的记录(6-5)中发现了他们2月4日下午2点的预测意见。我们没有核对海城地震观测站以前是否提出过其他的(有误的)预测。
显然,对上述调查对象发挥关键性作用的陈琪福(中国地震局地震预测研究所研究员),孙士宏(中国地震局台网中心研究员)与王安东(辽宁省地震局),为了维护中国地震局辽宁省地震局对1975年海城地震预报中的主体地位,他们对海城地震观测站等当地许多“群测点”对1975年海城地震预报做出的重大贡献有意地轻描淡写不做详细考察。
例如:调查报告中有记录如下:
-- At 2:40 p.m.: There is a record in the log book of Anshan City’s Earthquake Office (6 – 5): at 2:40 p.m. on 4 February 1975 (during the relative foreshock quiescence), Zhu [Fengming] of the provincial Earthquake Office in Shenyang, when answering the phone and listening to reports, “estimated that a large earthquake might occur.”
-- 下午2:40时∶在鞍山地震办公室的日志中有一个记录〔6-5〕∶1975年2月4日下午2:40〔前震活动相对平静期间〕,在沈阳的辽宁省地震办公室的朱〔凤鸣〕,在回答电话和听取报告时,“估计一个强震可能发生”。
必须指出,鞍山地震办公室日志记录辽宁省地震办公室朱凤鸣表示“估计一个强震可能发生”的时间下午2:40,恰好是鞍山地震办公室收到海城地震观测站(“群测点”)上报他们“M4-5级以上的地震”预报意见的下午2:00之后40分钟,但是《预报1975年海城地震》对此没有进一步追查。
他们这样做的目的与作用在后边章节中更为露骨。
例如,调查报告确认:
-- Microscopic anomalies monitored by amateur groups prior to the Haicheng earthquake were mainly changes in telluric current. There were more than 70 such monitoring groups within 100 km of the future epicenter (Zhu and Wu, 1982).
-- 海城地震前由业余小组(“群测点”)监测的微观异常主要为地电(telluric current)变化。(海城地震)未来震中周围100公里内有70个这样的监测小组(“群测点”)(Zhu and Wu, 1982)。
“海城地震前由业余小组(“群测点”)监测的微观异常主要为地电(telluric current)变化。(海城地震)未来震中周围100公里内有70个这样的监测小组”,必定留下了海城地震前、期间及地震有极其珍贵的大量丰富地电(telluric current)变化记录资料。《预报1975年海城地震》调查报告对此为什么没有对此作任何全面深入的科学分析、研究与总结?
调查报告最后部分总结如下:
-- Usefulness of the Anomalies in Predicting the Haicheng Earthquake
-- 不同的异常对预测海城地震的用处
-- As others have concluded, the foreshock sequence (Fig. 7) was the most important evidence used in the imminent prediction of the Haicheng earthquake. ……
-- 如同其他人已经做出结论的那样,前震序列(图7)是用来对海城地震做出临震预测的最为重要的证据。
-- To the workers of the Liaoning provincial Earthquake Office, the Jinxian leveling data and other professionally made observations, such as the radon and tilt anomalies discussed by Raleigh et al. (1977), were useful in sending alerting signals months and weeks before the earthquake, although there is no evidence that these data played any role in the provincial imminent prediction.
-- 对于辽宁省地震办公室的工作人员而言,金县的地平水准数据以及其他专业观测,例如Raleigh et al.(1977)讨论过的氡以及地倾斜异常,对于震前数月数周前发出预警信号而言有用,然而没有任何证据说明这些数据在省级的临震预测中发挥了任何作用。
-- The workers did not have time to analyze anomalous telluric current changes reported by amateur workers, nor did they seem to be very interested because of observational noise and artifacts. Some of the amateur telluric observations shown by Raleigh et al. (1977), such as those obtained by middle school students, were regularly mentioned during group discussions of the provincial Earthquake Office (6 – 2) but never quoted in its official reports. These observations became prominent in propaganda campaigns after the earthquake. The merit of the massive amateur involvement in microscopic precursory monitoring before the Haicheng earthquake is in its educational effects, as discussed in the Basis for Evacuation Decisions section, not in its scientific contribution.
-- (辽宁省地震办公室的)工作人员没有时间对业余工作人员报告的地电变化异常做任何分析,由于观测中的噪音以及人为因素他们看起来对此也没有什么特别兴趣。Raleigh et al. (1977)给出的某些业余地电观测,例如中学生获得的地电观测记录,在省级地震办公室小组讨论中经常提到(6-2),但在官方报告中从来没有引用。震后的宣传运动中对这些观测特别强调。地震前广大业余(“群测点”)参与微观前兆监测活动的价值在于其教育作用,如同“撤离决定的基础”部分中讨论的那样,而不是其科学贡献。
(陈一文顾问注:1982年,在国家地震局审核支持下由地震出版社出版的同一位朱凤鸣等编著的《一九七五年海城地震》第60-63页上总共列出47个群测群防点绝大部分发生在震前2月3日-4日的确确实实出现的地电突跳异常信息。全面抹杀辽宁省地区这些群测群防点监测到的地电突跳异常是临震前兆的科学贡献,将它们的“价值”轻描淡写为“教育作用”,不仅是自己打自己的嘴巴,而且是包括主编《一九七五年海城地震》的朱凤鸣自己在内的中国地震局“专家”,误导加拿大学者对海城地区广大业余“群测点”对于海城地震前主要依据地电异常做出了成功预测重大贡献的赤裸裸的背叛!中国地震局的“专家”应当为此向海城地区广大业余“群测点”的功臣们公开道歉!)
-- Relation of the Anomalies with the Earthquake: For some of the anomalies, their theoretical relation with earthquakes may require decades or centuries of research. An empirical answer can be based on anything between the lack of other obvious causes and a significant correlation established with many earthquakes. For the Haicheng earthquake, the relationship of most of the reported anomalies to the earthquake is uncertain but cannot be ruled out.
-- 这些异常与地震的关系:对于某些异常,他们与地震之间的理论关系可能需要数十年以至数世纪才能够搞清楚。完全根据经验的回答可以基于缺乏其他明显的原因以及缺乏建立与多次地震之间的重要相关性。对于海城地震,所报告的大部分异常与地震的关系不确定,但也不能排除在外。
(陈一文顾问注:本文发表之前,本人没有见到西方任何官方地震学家敢于公开鼓吹“这些异常与地震的关系:对于某些异常,他们与地震之间的理论关系可能需要数十年以至数世纪才能够搞清楚。”但是,在中国地震局陈建民局长解决“地震预报……需要几代人甚至几十代人长期坚持不懈地努力” 指导思想下,将没有任何科学依据被判科学探索精神的“可能需要数十年以至数世纪才能够搞清楚”塞入本调查报告,误导毒害世界地震学界!)
-- Truthfulness of Reported Anomalies
-- 所报告的异常的真实性
-- Although it is impossible to verify each anomaly report, there is no evidence that there was systematic fabrication of anomaly reports after the earthquake. The log books of the Shipengyu Observatory and the Earthquake Office of Anshan City and the notebook of Yingkou County’s Earthquake Office contain many, albeit incomplete, reports of macroscopic and microscopic anomalies.
-- 尽管不可能核实每一项异常报告,没有证据表明在震后对这些异常报告做了系统的伪造。石硼峪地震台、鞍山地震办公室,以及营口县地震办公室的记录本,包含了对宏观和微观异常的许多报告,尽管对异常的报告不够完整。
-- Many of the microscopic anomalies have been scrutinized by the U.S. delegation (Raleigh et al., 1977). One exception is the telluric current readings responsible for the prediction by the Haicheng amateur observatory (see Action and Inaction in Haicheng County section). We found that in the SSB document to promote the observatory as one of the six units that rendered “meritorious services in the analysisprediction of southern Liaoning earthquake” (7 – 10), the time of their reading jump was altered from before 2 p.m. to 3:50 p.m., so that the 7:36 p.m. earthquake was nearly within the observatory’s predicted 3-hour time window. This explains why such a celebrated data set was not shown to the U.S. delegation. However, incidents like this seem to be rare.
-- 美国代表团对于许多微观异常进行了详细审查(Raleigh et al., 1977)。唯一的例外是海城业余观察站(“群测点”)预测用的地电(telluric current)记录(参看“海城县”部分中的“行动与不行动”。我们发现国家地震局(SSB)用于宣传海城地震观测站为“辽南地震分析预测中有功”六个单位之一的文件(7-10),把他们记录到脉冲的时间从下午2点推迟到下午3:50,以便使晚上7:36发生的地震处于观测站预测的3小时窗口以内。这说明了为什么这样值得著名的数据没有给美国代表团看。然而,这样的事件看来很稀少。
(陈一文顾问注:这说明海城业余观察站(“群测点”)没有造假,而是国家地震局造假!)
-- Applicability of the Precursory Anomalies to Other Earthquakes
-- 前兆性异常与其他地震的适用性
-- Can similar anomalies be used as precursors to other earthquakes? This question is the most fascinating but is inducive to misleadingly superficial answers. For any one type of anomaly, the answer to the question may be “no.” For example, use of significant foreshocks, the most important precursor for Haicheng, was not applicable to the disastrous 1976 M 7.8 Tangshan earthquake (Fig. 1). Within two months prior to the Tangshan earthquake, not a single foreshock was detected by the regional seismic network that could detect events of ML _ 1.7 (Chen et al., 1988) or MS _ 1 (SSB Editorial Group, 1982), although some other types of anomaly that had preceded the Haicheng earthquake also to some degree preceded the Tangshan earthquake (SSB Editorial Group, 1982).
-- 类似的异常可否作为其他的地震的前兆?这个问题最为迷人但是可能导致令人误导的肤浅的答案。对于一种异常,对这个问题的答复可能是“不能”。例如,采用意义重大的前震,对于海城地震最为重要的前兆,就不适用于灾难性的1976M7.8级唐山地震(图1)。唐山地震前两个月,有能力探测到ML1.7级地震(Chen et al, 1988)或Ms1级地震(国家地震局编辑组,1982)的当地的地震台网没有监测到哪怕一个地震,尽管某些类型的异常在唐山地震前一定程度上也出现(国家地震局编辑组,1982)。
-- Conclusions
-- 结论
-- Our findings have largely confirmed the sequence of events before the Haicheng earthquake that the U.S. delegation was told during their visit to China in 1976 (Raleigh et al., 1977), with the following four significant disparities.
-- 我们的调查研究在很大程度上确认了美国代表团1976年访华期间被告知的那些事件的顺序(Raleigh et al., 1977),但是存在四项重要的不一致:
(1) The events do not fit the ideal model of four-stage (longterm, middle-term, short-term, and imminent) prediction. In particular, there was no official short-term prediction, although such a prediction was made by individual scientists.
(1) 这些事件与地震预测的理想模型(长期、中期、短期与临震)不相符。主要,没有官方的短期预测,尽管独立的科学家曾做出这样的预测。
(2) We have noticed some major factual inaccuracies in the story they learned. For example, the claim that on 4 February 1975 the provincial government was “given a prediction of a strong earthquake near Haicheng for that day” is untrue.
(2) 我们注意到他们听到的故事中有某些主要事实上的错误。例如,声称1975年2月4日向省政府“提交了海城附近当天将发生一次强烈地震的预测”是不真实的。
(3) The story publicized and told to foreigners in the 1970s was biased by a desire to emphasize the leadership of the Party Committee of Liaoning Province. Details were either neglected or exaggerated to help emphasize this point.
(3) 70年代广泛宣扬并告诉给外国人的故事有意强调辽宁省党委的领导。详细情况或者被忽视或者夸大以强调这一点。
(4) The importance of amateur microscopic-anomaly, such as telluric currents, monitoring was exaggerated in the story told to foreigners and the public.
(4) 业余(“群测点”)的异常,例如地电的监测,成为向外国人与公众夸大的故事。
(陈一文顾问注:为了抹杀海城地区广大业余“群测点”引用群众性创新的地电监测技术对于海城地震临震前成功预测的贡献及其科学意义,不惜误导加拿大学者颠倒是非!)
-- On the day of the earthquake, Yingkou County was the first to issue an imminent prediction, and there were unofficial imminent predictions by professional or amateur earthquake workers in other places later during the day. None of these predictions can be scientifically explained.
-- 地震当天,营口县第一个发布临震预测,其他地方的专业或业余地震工作者当天晚些时候也有非官方的临震预测。这些预测都无法做出科学解释。
1975年海城地震成功预报后32年,中国地震局的“专家”至今对于海城地区广大业余“群测点”引用群众性创新的地电监测技术临震前成功预测海城地震“无法做出科学解释”,又不肯放下架子向能够“做出科学解释”的中国地震预测实践研究“专家”虚心请教,还要误导加拿大学者写这个调查报告,凭籍“国际地震研究的顶尖期刊《美国地震学报》(Bulletin Seismology Society of America)”为自己的无能与无作为提供借口。
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